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The Gunn Plumbing, Inc., executed and delivered a promissory note
to the plaintiff-bank which was personally guaranteed by the president of
the defendant-company, a closely held corporation. A discounted amount
was credited to the company's account, and the plaintiff was paid an
additional sum for making the loan. At maturity the note was renewed, and
when the renewal note was not paid, the plaintiff filed suit against the
maker and the guarantor. When the defendants asserted the defense of
usury, the parties settled through a stipulation in which a compromise
amount was agreed upon, and the defendants in that stipulation withdrew
their defenses for all present and future proceedings arising out of the
transaction. Additionally, the stipulation provided that the plaintiff would
renew the note, which was to be personally guaranteed by the company
president and his wife. The individuals were also to guarantee a note for
attorney's fees, both notes to be in consideration for the renewal. Upon
default of the renewal note, suit was again filed, and the defendants again
asserted the affirmative defense of usury. The plaintiff was granted sum-
mary judgment by the trial court, and the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, affirmed.' Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court
of Florida on the basis of a conflict with a prior holding of the District
Court of Appeal, Third District.' The supreme court in discharging the
writ held: Regardless of whether the note was usurious or not, the stipula-
tion entered into between the parties was binding and the defendants had
effectively waived the right to raise the affirmative defense of usury.' Gunn
Plumbing, Inc. v. Dania Bank, 252 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1971).
Usury has been defined as "the taking, or agreement for, a greater
rate for the use or forbearance of money loaned, than is allowed by law."4
At common law usury was not forbidden, and parties were free to contract
to loan or borrow money at whatever rate they chose.5 Therefore, the issue
of usury became one of legislative concern, and today it is subject entirely
to statutory regulation.' Florida makes it unlawful to charge interest in
excess of 10 percent to any borrower other than a corporation and unlawful
to charge in excess of 15 percent to a corporation.7 The penalties for usury
range from forfeiture of interest8 to forfeiture of principal and interest.9
1. Gunn Plumbing, Inc. v. Dania Bank, 239 So.2d 88 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) [per curiam].
2. Coral Gables First Nat'l Bank v. Constructors of Florida Inc., 119 So.2d 741 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1960).
3. Mr. Justice Dekle filed a lone dissent.
4. County Comm'rs v. King, 13 Fla' 451, 466 (1869).
5. Matlack Properties, Inc. v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 120 Fla. 77, 162 So. 148
(1935).
6. Florida first adopted a usury statute in 1891. See FLA. STAT. §§ 687.01-.11 (1971).
7. FLA. STAT. § 687.02 (1971).
8. FLA. STAT. § 687.04 (1971).
9. FLA. STAT. § 687.07 (1971).
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However, in situations such as Gunn, where the issue is one of civil usury,
the penalty is usually the forfeiture of interest unless the "interest is taken
or reserved, or has been paid," in which case the creditor forfeits double
the amount of interest so taken. °
Florida courts have stated that the purpose of the usury statute is "to
bind the power of creditors over necessitous debtors and prevent them from
extorting harsh terms in the making of loans,"" and, "to protect the needy
borrower by penalizing the unconscionable money lender." 12 The law
treats usurious lenders as oppressors,'" and through the statute, attempts
to place the borrower on an equal footing with his lender so as to overcome
the lender's superior bargaining power and thus avoid unconscionability.
Since lenders have long attempted to avoid usurious contracts by
devices such as renewal notes and releases, case law in Florida has de-
veloped with the policy behind the statute foremost in mind. In addressing
itself to renewal contracts, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in
Coral Gables First National Bank v. Constructors of Florida Inc.,'4
enunciated the controlling principle that
[t]he general rule followed in this state is that the usurious
character of a contract must be determined as of its inception,
and if usurious at that time, no subsequent transactions will
purge it. When such contracts are renewed by a new or sub-
stituted contract, usury follows and becomes a part of the latter
contract, making it vulnerable to the defense of usury in like
manner as the original contract. This is not true, however, when
the old contract is abandoned and a new one is entered into free
from the vice of the old.5
The Supreme Court of Florida has also developed rules regarding renewal
notes. The two ways of purging the contract of usury, as stated by the
court, are:
first by a renewal of the note or contract, after it has passed into
the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice of
the usury; secondly, by a reformation of the contract, by
which the usurious interest is expunged by remitting the excess,
and only lawful interest is retained or exacted. 6
It is readily apparent that the only two ways the Gunn company's
note could have been purged of any usury was either by remitting the
excess interest charged' 7 or by substituting a new agreement which would
10. FLA. STAT. § 687.04 (1971).
11. River Hills, Inc. v. Edwards, 190 So.2d 415, 423 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
12. First Mortgage Corp. v. Stellmon, 170 S.2d 302, 304 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
13. Chakford v. Sturm, 65 So.2d 864 (Fla. 1953).
14. 119 So.2d 741 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
15. Id. at 746-47 (emphasis in original).
16. Clark v. Grey, 101 Fla. 1058, 1065, 132 So. 832, 834 (1931).
17. Id.
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contain only a lawful rate of interest.'8 The majority position regarding
the purging of usury in renewal or substitute contracts is in accord with the
Florida position"9 as expressed in Clark v. Grey.20 Thus, if the amount
owing on a usurious contract is compromised, the new amount must be
such that the interest is brought below the statutory limit.2 '
The renewal contract technique is but one of the many methods used
by lenders to circumvent the usury laws. In order to determine if a loan
is usurious, Florida courts look to the substance of the transaction, rather
than to the form.22 This method is consistent with what the courts believe
to be the legislative intent of the usury statutes-preventing the exaction
of usury by the use of any scheme, device, or indirect process.23
In Beacham v. Carr,24 the Supreme Court of Florida laid down rules
governing schemes to evade the usury statutes:
It cannot be held that a design formulated in the mind of the
lender to evade the evident purpose of the usury laws and still
exact his unlawful interest would be permitted, especially in a
court of equity.
"The cupidity of lenders, and the willingness of borrowers
to concede whatever may be demanded or to promise whatever
may be extracted in order to obtain temporary relief from
financial embarrassment, as would naturally be expected, have
resulted in a great variety of devices to evade the usury laws;
and to frustrate such evasions the courts have been compelled
to look beyond the form of a transaction to its substance, and
they have laid it down as an inflexible rule that the mere form
is immaterial, but that it is the substance which must be con-
sidered. 25
However, it is important to note that procedurally usury is raised as
an affirmative defense, and as such, is a purely personal defense which
may be asserted or waived at the option of the aggrieved party.26 In
18. Carter v. Leon Loan & Fin. Co., 108 Fla. 567, 146 So. 664 (1933). In referring to the
substituted agreement with legal interest, the court stated that "it is an act of justice for-
bidden by no principle of public policy, and will be enforced." Id. at 569, 146 So. at 665.
19. See Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1184 (1931), superseding 13 A.L.R. 1213 (1921).
20. 101 Fla. 1058, 132 So. 832 (1931).
21. Calimpco, Inc. v. Warden, 100 Cal. App. 2d 429, 224 P.2d 421 (1950).
22. See, e.g., May v. U.S. Leasing Corp., 239 So.2d 73 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970); Indian
Lake Estates, Inc. v. Special Investments, Inc., 154 So.2d 883 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963); Kay v.
Amendola, 129 So.2d 170 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
23. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Doris R. Corp., 111 So.2d 682 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
24. 122 Fla. 736, 166 So. 456 (1936).
25. Id. at 742-43, 166 So. at 459, quoting 27 R.C.L. 211 § 12 (1929).
26. Mackey v. Thompson, 153 Fla. 210, 14 So.2d 571 (1943).
Under certain conditions usury may be a real defense. Deciding whether the defense
is real or personal depends upon local law.
If under . . . law the effect of . . .the illegality is to make the obligation entirely
null and void, the defense may be asserted against a holder in due course. Other-
wise it is cut off.
UNUORM COMMCIAL CODE § 3-305, Comment 6. See also W. BarroN, BILLS AND NoTEs
§ 127 (2d ed. 1961).
1972]
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Yaffee v. International Company,27 the court stated that the effect of the
usury statute is not to invalidate contracts with usurious interest, but
merely to give the maker "the personal privilege of setting up, or waiving
.. defenses ... in respect to such contracts.1 28 In order to prevail, the
party asserting the defense must sustain the burden of proof.
After reviewing pertinent usury law, the supreme court in Gunn
completely avoided the question of usury and based its decision on the
stipulation to waive the defense, holding the waiver to be valid. In so doing,
the high court quoted its 1939 decision in Dunscombe v. Smith,20 which
emphasized the long-standing position of Florida courts with respect to
the integrity and enforceability of stipulations.8 0
"This Court is committed to the rule that it not only
approves but favors stipulations and agreements on the part of
litigants and counsel designed to simplify, shorten or settle
litigation and save costs to the parties, and the time of the Court,
and when such stipulations or agreements are entered into be-
tween parties litigant or their counsel, the same should be
enforced by the court, unless good cause is shown to the con-
trary. In order to obtain relief against stipulations, the regular
course is not to ignore or attempt to evade it, but to make a
seasonable and affirmative application by formal motion to the
court, on notice and supported by affidavit for its withdrawal
or revocation."
31
Thus, having completely avoided the question of usury, the court found
no conflict with Coral Gables First National Bank v. Constructors of
Florida Inc.,"2 and discharged certiorari.
There are many factors which demonstrate the inherent weaknesses
in the court's reasoning. First, based on its earlier decisions in Mackey v.
Thompson3 and Yaffee v. International Company, Inc., 4 the court held
that a waiver of the defense of usury was valid. However, it is questionable
as to whether Mackey and Yaffee in fact yield such a result. In Mackey,
the plaintiff had made a loan to the defendant in Indiana. When the note
was not paid, suit was filed in Florida, since both parties had become
Florida residents. The defendant pleaded the defense of usury and moved
for a directed verdict, which was denied by the court. Upon motion of the
plaintiff, the trial court instructed the jury that the contract was governed
27. 80 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1955).
28. Id. at 912.
29. 139 Fla. 497, 504, 190 So. 796, 799 (1939).
30. See also Smith v. Smith, 90 Fla. 824, 107 So. 257 (1925) ; Esch v. Forster, 123 Fla.
905, 168 So. 229 (1936).
31. Gunn Plumbing, Inc. v. Dania Bank, 252 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1972), quoting Duns-
combe v. Smith, 139 Fla. 497, 504, 190 So. 796, 799 (1939).
32. 119 So.2d 741 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
33. 153 Fla. 210, 14 So.2d 571 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Mackey].
34. 80 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1955) [hereinafter cited as Yaffee].
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by Indiana law. The defendant failed to offer any proof as to the usury law
in Indiana, and plaintiff's judgment was affirmed on appeal."5
In Yaffee, a loan was made to the defendant prior to the enactment
of Florida Statutes section 687.02 (1971) which extended the protection
of the usury statutes to corporations. The court reasoned that because
usury was unknown at common law, the anti-usury statute would not be
applied retroactively to a loan predating its enactment. 6 Viewed in this
light, it is readily apparent that these cases merely indicate that since usury
is strictly regulated by statute, the party availing himself of the defense
must prove that the transaction violated the governing usury statute at the
time the transaction took place. The Gunn court, by granting a summary
judgment based on the waiver of the defense of usury, clearly did not
provide the defendants the opportunity to prove a usurious contract.
The second weakness of the court's reasoning in Gunn concerned the
stipulation issue. Although stipulations are favorably regarded and will
be enforced except upon motion to the court to rescind or reform based
on good cause, the court's analysis failed to focus on the use of stipulations
as a device to avoid usury laws. In Smith v. Smith,87 the court stated:
[g]enerally all stipulations of parties or their attorneys for the
government of their conduct or the control of their rights ...
are enforced by the courts, if such stipulations are not unreason-
able, nor against good morals or sound public policy.
8
It is clear that the policy behind the usury laws is to protect the borrower;
thus, the general law regarding contracts freely bargained and entered
into should be disregarded. The Gunn court did not recognize, as the
Beacham v. Carr" court had years before, that borrowers in financial
distress are willing to pay whatever interest rate the lender demands in
order to obtain temporary financial relief.4" The court should have at-
tacked the validity of the stipulation on the grounds that it was against
public policy or that it was an illegal scheme to evade the usury laws.
By basing its decision on waiver and denying a conflict with Coral
Gables First National Bank v. Constructors of Florida, Inc.,41 the court
has further complicated the development of anti-usury case law and opened
an enormous loophole. Indeed, the facts in Constructors and Gunn are
remarkably similar. In Constructors, a case which involved the foreclosure
of usurious mortgages, the defendants answered and defended on the
grounds that the note in controversy was a renewal of an earlier usurious
35. Mackey v. Thompson, 153 Fla. 210, 14 So.2d 571 (1943).
36. Yaffey v. Int'l Co., 80 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1955).
37. 90 Fla. 824, 107 So. 257 (1925).
38. Id. at 830-31, 107 So. at 260, quoting 20 ENCYCLOPAEDiA OF PLEADNG AND PRACTICE
607 (1901).
39. 122 Fla. 736, 166 So. 456 (1936).
40. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
41. 119 So.2d 741 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960) [hereinafter cited as Constructors].
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note.42 The defendants also pointed to an executed usury release and
argued that the release plus the purifying renewal note erased any usury
claim.43 Completely bypassing the release question specifically, the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, rejected the defendants' arguments and
held that
the usurious character of a contract must be determined as of...
its inception, and if usurious, at that time, no subsequent trans-
actions will purge it. When such contracts are renewed by a new
or substituted contract, usury follows and becomes a part of the
latter contract, making it vulnerable to the defense . . in like
manner as the original contract."
4
The facts in Gunn were strikingly similar, but with one notable
exception. The Gunn court found and dwelled upon the stipulation of
waiver of the defense of usury whereas the Constructors court had not.
Thus, in Gunn, where the waiver/release was drawn as a stipulation, the
defendant was able to escape the anti-usury statutes. Gunn may well have
mapped the destruction of the Florida usury laws in one stroke.
In a strong dissent, Mr. Justice Dekle criticized the majority holding
on three fronts: first, there were only limited statutory exceptions to the
anti-usury law, and the Gunn fact pattern did not fit any of them; second,
the decision was clearly contrary to both the legislative purpose of the
statute and prior decisional law; and third, assuming for the sake of argu-
ment that the decision was correct, the stipulation could not have operated
against Mrs. Gunn since she had not been a party to the first transaction."
The justice continued:
The criterion here enunciated is but an invitation to the unfair
lender simply to obtain the type of "waiver" so adroitly and uni-
laterally devised in this case, and to have the borrower immedi-
ately after the loan to sign and leave with the lender such a pro-
tective device.4"
The Gunn court was faced with an opportunity to reinforce the strong
anti-usury laws in Florida. In the face of this challenge, the court con-
tented itself to decide the case on a procedural nicety, and in the process,
ripped the very essence out of the enforceability of anti-usury laws.
Furthermore, by estopping a non-signatory to the first note who did sign
the second from raising the defense of usury, lenders have been provided
with at least one method of securing court-enforced usury rates without
the necessity of even a second note ceremony. In this era of increased
42. Id. at 743.
43. Id. at 745.
44. Id. at 746-47 (emphasis in original).
45. Gunn Plumbing, Inc. v. Dania Bank, 252 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1971) (dissenting opinion).
46. IM. at 6.
CASES NOTED
sensitivity to consumer protection, the Supreme Court of Florida has taken
a giant step backwards and has issued "an invitation to the unfair
lender ...,4 to take unconscionable advantage of the unwary borrower.
PAUL H. FREEMAN
COMITY: AN EFFECTIVE BAR TO COLLATERAL ATTACK-
OF A FOREIGN COURT'S JURISDICTION
AFTER JUDGMENT
Defendant, Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., an American concern,
planned to introduce "Tarzan chewing gum" into England in conjunction
with the English plaintiff, Somportex, Ltd. The plans never reached
fruition. Alleging the existence and breach of a contract, the English
firm sought damages in the English courts. Extraterritorial service was
had on the American defendant under an English long-arm statute.' The
American firm responded by making a conditional appearance, permitted
under English procedure,2 to contest jurisdiction. The American defen-
dant then attempted to withdraw its appearance, but the court refused.
Its jurisdictional objections were overruled,8 which had the effect, under
English law, of converting the conditional appearance into an uncondi-
tional one.4 On the basis of a second motion, the American company was
given permission to withdraw from the proceedings.5 The English Court
of Appeal, however, reversed the lower court ruling which had allowed
the American firm to withdraw; this placed Philadelphia Chewing Gum
in the position of having entered an unconditional appearance.' The
defendant made no further appearance in the English proceedings, even
though the jurisdictional finding was apparently still open to appeal.7
A default judgment was, thereafter, entered.' Enforcement of the English
judgment was then sought in the federal district court in Philadelphia,
where the English plaintiff was granted a summary judgment.9 On appeal,
47. Id.
1. The English company obtained leave of court, under R. S. C. 1965, Ord. 12, r. 7, to
serve notice of its suit extraterritorially.
2. R. S. C. 1965, Ord. 12, r. 7. A conditional appearance has an effect similar to that of a
special appearance under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
3. Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., [1968] 3 All E.R. 26.
4. R. S. C. 1965, Ord. 12, r. 7.
5. Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., [1968] 3 All E.R. 26.
6. Id. at 29.
7. Id.
8. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa.
1970).
9. Id.
